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ENFORCEMENT OF OPEN SOURCE SOFTWARE LICENSES: 
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ABSTRACT  
The Federal Circuit’s ruling in Jacobsen v. Katzer finally settled 
the question of whether open source licenses are enforceable. 
Unfortunately, three recent cases from the Ninth Circuit have 
complicated matters. I call this trio of cases the “MDY Trio” in 
honor of the Ninth Circuit’s prior trio of licensing cases known as 
the “MAI Trio.” On the surface, the MDY Trio provides a boost 
for the enforceability of software licenses, but the MDY Trio also 
creates two significant complications for open source licenses. 
First, the MDY Trio’s test for distinguishing between licenses and 
copyright “first sales” does not fit open source licenses. Second, 
the MDY Trio’s method of delineating between contractual 
covenants and license conditions will prevent many open source 
licensors from obtaining injunctive relief. This complication is 
particularly dire because injunctive relief is the most critical 
remedy in enforcing open source licenses. My article proposes a 
modification to the MDY Trio’s test for determining whether a 
transaction is a license or first sale that better fits open source 
licenses. The article also proposes a more effective approach to 
distinguishing between contractual covenants and license 
conditions by focusing on remedies. My alternative approach 
capitalizes on the experience of trial courts in granting injunctive 
relief, serves the public policies underlying copyright and contract 
law, and better fits open source licenses. Given the importance of 
licensing as a transaction model in the information economy, other 
federal courts soon will be deciding whether to follow or diverge 
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In the past, if a software “hacker”1 happened to meet an 
American lawyer, the first question the hacker would ask the 
lawyer is this: “Are open source software licenses enforceable in 
the United States?” Lawyers usually gave three answers to that 
question. First, since courts in the United States enforced other 
types of mass-market software licenses, a lawyer might say that 
surely courts would enforce open source licenses as well. Second, 
a lawyer might say that some courts outside the United States 
enforced them. And finally, a lawyer might say that because people 
are abiding by the terms of open source licenses as if they were 
enforceable, for all intents and purposes the licenses are self-
enforcing. These answers seldom satisfied software hackers who 
retorted, “Give me a clear ‘yes’ or ‘no’ answer!” Now lawyers can 
give a clear “yes” answer, thanks to the Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit’s ruling in Jacobsen v. Katzer.2  Or at least lawyers 
could until three recent cases decided by a single 3 judge panel of 
the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit: Vernor v. Autodesk, 
MDY Industries v. Blizzard Entertainment, and UMG Recordings 
v. Augusto.3 I call these cases the “MDY Trio”4 to honor the Ninth 
Circuit’s prior trio of licensing cases known as the “MAI Trio” (so 
named for the MAI Systems v. Peak Computer case5).  
Vernor v. Autodesk arose when Autodesk attempted to 
enforce a software license prohibiting the resale of copies of its 
AutoCAD software. MDY Industries v. Blizzard Entertainment 
focused on Blizzard Entertainment’s attempt to enforce its 
software license and on-line terms of use that prohibited gamers 
from deploying robots to play the World of Warcraft game for 
them in order to move up game levels. UMG Recordings v. 
Augusto involved an attempt by a music record company to 
enforce an “evaluation only” condition that accompanied music 
                                                
1 Software developers with a passion for programming are called “hackers.” See 
THE NEW HACKER’S DICTIONARY 233-34 (3d ed. 1996). In common parlance 
the word hacker often refers to programmers who create software viruses and 
worms but among serious programmers the term carries a positive connotation 
as in “I’m hacking some code to fix that bug.” See id. at 234; STEVEN LEVY, 
HACKERS: HEROES OF THE COMPUTER REVOLUTION (1984).  
2 Jacobsen v. Katzer, 535 F.3d 1373, 1385 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
3 Vernor v. Autodesk, 621 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2010); MDY Industries v. 
Blizzard Entertainment, 629 F.3d 928 (9th Cir. 2010); UMG Recordings v. 
Augusto, 628 F.3d 1175 (9th Cir. 2010). The three judges siting on the panel 
were William C. Canby, Jr., Consuelo M. Callahan, and Sandra S. Ikuta.  
4 “MDY,” of course, refers to MDY Industries v. Blizzard Entertainment.  
5 991 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1995). The other two cases in the trio are Wall Data, 
Inc. v. Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Dept., 447 F.3d 769 (9th Cir. 2006) and 
Triad Sys. Corp. v. Se. Express Co., 64 F.3d 1330 (9th Cir. 1995). 
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CDs sent unsolicited by the record company to professional music 
reviewers.  
The Ninth Circuit panel released the Vernor decision first. 
In enforcing Autodesk’s software license, the court articulated a 
new test for determining when a transaction should be 
characterized as a license and when it should be characterized as a 
Copyright Act “first sale.” The Ninth Circuit panel released the 
MDY decision next. In MDY, the court applied the Vernor test and 
ruled that Blizzard Entertainment had licensed its game software 
rather than sold a copy of it.6 The MDY court then turned its 
attention to the actual license terms to decide whether the court 
would grant injunctive relief for breach of the license. This 
determination rested on whether a given license term could be 
characterized as a “condition” on the grant of copyrights or, 
instead, a run-of-the-mill contractual covenant. The court’s MDY 
opinion articulated a new test for evaluating whether a license term 
is a license condition or, instead, a contractual covenant. Last, the 
panel released the Augusto decision. In a relatively brief opinion, 
the court simply applied the Vernor test to hold that the transaction 
amounted to a Copyright Act first sale rather than a license, based 
on all the facts and circumstances surrounding the transaction. 
The MDY Trio addresses two important issues in software 
licensing. First, it addresses the issue of when a software 
transaction should be characterized as a Copyright Act “first sale”7 
and when it should be characterized as a “license.”8 This 
determination affects the software user’s right to use or redistribute 
a software copy that he or she acquired. If a transaction is a 
license, then the software user must abide by the scope of use and 
distribution described in the license agreement; if the transaction is 
a first sale, then the user can ignore any such restrictions on use or 
distribution of the copy. Second, even if a software transaction 
qualifies as a license, certain terms of the license can be 
characterized as contractual covenants and other terms as license 
                                                
6 Even though this Article points out the importance of the MDY Industries case 
in the context of software licensing, it is equally notable for its application of the 
Digital Millennium Copyright Act in a manner that differs from the Federal 
Circuit’s approach in Chamberlin Group, Inc. v. Skylink Techs., 381 F.3d 1178 
(Fed. Cir. 2004) and Storage Tech. Corp. v. Custom Hardware, 421 F.3d 1307 
(Fed. Cir. 2005). See also Jessica Gallegos, Note, A New Role for Tortious 
Interference in the Digital Age: A Model to Enforce End User License 
Agreements, 38 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 411 (2011) (discussing MDY’s treatment of 
tortious interference with contract). 
7 See 17 U.S.C. §109(a) (2006).  
8 See generally JAY DRATLER, LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (1999); 
ROGER MILGRIM, MILGRIM ON LICENSING (1999); RAYMOND T. NIMMER & JEFF 
C. DODD, MODERN LICENSING (2005); XUAN-THAO NGUYEN, ROBERT W. 
GOMULKIEWICZ & DANIELLE M. CONWAY, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, 
SOFTWARE & INFORMATION LICENSING: LAW & PRACTICE (2006).  
14 Yale J.L. & Tech. 106 (2011)        2011-2011 
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conditions. This characterization affects the remedies available for 
breach of the license contract. If a licensee violates a covenant, 
then the licensee is liable to pay damages for breach of contract; 
however, if the licensee violates a license condition, then this 
breach may also infringe the licensor’s rights under the Copyright 
Act, giving the licensor the ability to obtain injunctive relief. 
On the surface, the MDY Trio appears to provide a boost for 
the enforceability of software licenses. Some commentators have 
argued that most end user software transactions should be treated 
categorically as first sales rather than (to use software industry 
parlance) End User License Agreements (“EULAs”), but the MDY 
Trio rejects that argument. The MDY Trio, like most software 
licensing cases in the United States, upholds a software 
developer’s ability to choose mass-market end user licensing as a 
transaction model. Indeed, open source licensing is one of the most 
valuable software licensing practices that benefits from a policy 
that upholds licensing as a transaction model. As articulated by the 
Federal Circuit in Jacobsen v. Katzer, “Open source licensing has 
become a widely used method of creative collaboration that serves 
to advance the arts and sciences in a manner and at a pace that few 
could have imagined just a few decades ago.”9  
Below the surface, however, the MDY Trio creates 
inconvenient complications for open source licensing. First, the 
MDY Trio’s test that distinguishes between licenses and copyright 
first sales does not fit open source licensing because it focuses too 
much on use and transfer restrictions, neither of which are present 
in open source licenses. Under the MDY Trio’s test, many popular 
open source licenses such the GNU General Public License 
(“GPL”) will not qualify as licenses. Second (and more dire), the 
MDY Trio’s method of delineating between contractual covenants 
and license conditions will prove problematic for open source 
licensing, depriving open source licensors of the ability to obtain 
injunctive relief for breach of key open source licensing terms. For 
example, the all-important “share alike” term in the GPL may not 
qualify as a license condition. Consequently, a GPL licensor’s only 
useful remedy—injunctive relief—would not be available if a 
licensee fails to “share alike.”  
This Article argues that the best way to reconcile the MDY 
Trio’s license/first sale test with open source licensing is to read 
the test as one way, but not the only way, to prove that a 
transaction is a license. In other words, if a transaction meets the 
test it certainly qualifies as a license; however, there may be other 
                                                
9 535 F.3d 1373, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2008). “There are substantial benefits, 
including economic benefits, to the creation and distribution of copyrighted 
works under public licenses that range far beyond traditional license royalties.” 
Id. at 1379. 
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ways to demonstrate that a transaction is a license, such as by 
showing that the user received permission to exercise more 
copyrights than the user would have under a first sale. If the user 
gets more rights, as the user naturally would under an open source 
license, then the transaction is not a first sale.  
This Article also critiques the MDY Trio’s test for 
determining whether a particular term in a license should be 
deemed a contractual covenant rather than a license condition. In 
particular, it argues that the MDY Trio’s test puts trial courts in the 
difficult position of drawing critical bright lines based on sketchy 
criteria, namely whether a purported condition has a “nexus” with 
or “grounding” in an exclusive copyright. Instead, the Article 
proposes shifting the analysis to the remedies aspect of the case, 
where the court is better situated to consider the “nexus” and 
“grounding” factors along with other important factors such as 
whether granting injunctive relief would promote copyright and 
contract-related policies. In other words, since the 
condition/covenant distinction really only matters as it relates to 
the availability of injunctive relief, it is better to focus there. This 
approach also capitalizes on trial courts’ experience in weighing a 
variety of facts and circumstances in granting injunctive relief. 
Depending on the strength of the licensor’s showing that granting 
relief meets various licensing-related equitable factors, especially 
the factors highlighted in the MDY Trio and whether granting relief 
advances the public policies underlying contract and copyright 
law, then the trial court could grant (or refuse to grant) injunctive 
relief as appropriate to a particular license transaction. This sliding 
scale approach works better for all software licenses but especially 
open source licenses. The impact can be illustrated by using an 
example from the GPL. In a dispute between two sophisticated 
hackers, if the trial court finds a breach of the “share alike” 
obligation of the GPL, the court would be likely to grant injunctive 
relief using this Article’s approach; using the MDY Trio’s test, it 
would not. 
Section I of the Article provides a general description of 
open source licensing, including the importance of injunctive relief 
as a remedy for breach of open source licenses. Section II 
describes the debate about whether software transactions should be 
characterized as licenses or first sales and the implications of the 
characterization, the MDY Trio’s approach to delineating between 
the two, the complications this approach creates for open source 
licensing because of the court’s focus on use and distribution 
restrictions, and my analysis for reading the MDY Trio’s test in a 
manner that better fits open source licensing. Section III delves 
into the distinction between contractual covenants and license 
conditions, the implications this distinction has for injunction 
14 Yale J.L. & Tech. 106 (2011)        2011-2011 
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remedies, the MDY Trio’s approach to making the distinction, 
which forces a trial court to identify a clear boundary based on 
relatively sketchy criteria, and my proposal for an alternative 
approach which deploys the court’s test (along with other criteria) 
in a more useful fashion and in a more appropriate setting—at the 
remedies phase of a case.  
 
I. OPEN SOURCE LICENSES: THEIR NATURE AND 
ENFORCEABILITY 
 
A. The Nature of Open Source Licenses 
 
Use of the “open source” terminology can be confusing. 
Sometimes open source simply refers to a basic philosophy of 
freely sharing ideas, research, and materials. In this usage, people 
“open source” everything from classroom materials to information 
about distant solar systems.10 Other times open source refers to the 
software development model that is typically used in the open 
source community. In that model, a programmer creates software 
and posts the source code on the Internet, and a community grows 
up around the software as developers exchange bug fixes and new 
features.11 For purposes of this Article, however, the term open 
source refers to licensing software under open source licensing 
principles. Although open source licensing used to be obscure, 
many commentators now have described its nature and purposes.12  
In open source licensing the word “source” refers to 
software in its source code form. Programmers write software in 
source code form using a computer language such as Basic or C. 
Anyone proficient in the computer language can read and 
understand the source code.13   
The word “open” refers to the Open Source Definition 
(OSD).14 An organization called the Open Source Initiative15 
                                                
10 See generally CHRISTOPHER M. KELTY, TWO BITS: THE CULTURAL 
SIGNIFICANCE OF FREE SOFTWARE (2008). 
11 See generally STEVEN WEBER, THE SUCCESS OF OPEN SOURCE (2004). 
12 See generally HEATHER J. MEEKER, THE OPEN SOURCE ALTERNATIVE: 
UNDERSTANDING RISKS AND LEVERAGING OPPORTUNITIES (2008); LAWRENCE 
ROSEN, OPEN SOURCE LICENSING: SOFTWARE FREEDOM AND INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY LAW (2005); Robert W. Gomulkiewicz, How Copyleft Uses License 
Rights to Succeed in the Open Source Software Revolution and the Implications 
for Article 2B, 36 HOUS. L. REV. 179, 185 (1999) [hereinafter “How Copyleft 
Uses License Rights”]. 
13 See Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1243 
(3d Cir. 1983) (describing source and object code). 
14 See Ken Coar, Open Source Initiative, THE OPEN SOURCE DEFINITION, 
http://www.opensource.org/docs/osd (last visited May 24, 2011). 
15 Michael Tiemann, Open Source Initiative, ABOUT THE OPEN SOURCE 
INITIATIVE, http://www.opensource.org/about (last visited May 24, 2011). 
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created the OSD, which sets out general principles that a license 
must meet to be considered open source. For example, the OSD 
requires that an open source license grant the unencumbered right 
to use, make modifications, and distribute the licensed software.16 
The Free Software Foundation (FSF) prefers the term “free” rather 
than “open” to emphasize that the goal is to keep the software “free 
as in freedom.”17 Some programmers use the term “FOSS” to refer 
to free and open source software. Other names for open source 
licenses include “public,” “community,” “copyleft,” and “share 
and share alike.”18 From here, this Article adopts the FOSS 
nomenclature. 
FOSS stands in contrast to binary use software (BUS),19 
typically called proprietary20 or commercial21 software, which is 
software licensed in object code form primarily for end use only.22 
Binary (or object) code is software in machine-readable form that 
cannot be understood by humans. When distributed in binary form, 
software retains the secrecy of its inner workings (bolstered by 
provisions in the license contract against decompiling); this is 
important because some programmers view these inner workings 
as a valuable trade secret.23 Beyond retention of trade secrets, 
programmers employ BUS licensing because so few software users 
have skill or interest in looking at or modifying source code.24 
                                                
16 Id. 
17 See RICHARD M. STALLMAN, Why “Free Software” is Better than “Open 
Source,” in FREE SOFTWARE, FREE SOCIETY: SELECTED ESSAYS OF RICHARD M. 
STALLMAN 55, 56–58 (Joshua Gay ed., 2002). 
18 See Robert W. Gomulkiewicz, Debugging Open Source Software Licensing, 
64 U. PITT. L. REV. 75, 76 n.8 (2002) [hereinafter Gomulkiewicz, Debugging]; 
see also Jacobsen v. Katzer, 535 F.3d 1373, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (referring to 
“public” licenses); Richard M Stallman, What is Copyleft?, in FREE SOFTWARE, 
FREE SOCIETY, supra note 18, at 89-90 (describing “copyleft” licenses). 
19 Robert W. Gomulkiewicz, General Public License 3.0: Hacking the Free 
Software Movement’s Constitution, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 1015, 1021 (2005) 
(introducing the “BUS” nomenclature and explaining how it provides the most 
useful contrast to the open source software nomenclature). 
20 “Proprietary” is misleading in that open source licensing relies on a 
proprietary right, namely copyright. As open source programmers like to put it, 
you need a copyright before you can have a copyleft. 
21 “Commercial” is misleading because many open source programmers make a 
business of it. See Robert W. Gomulkiewicz, Entrepreneurial Open Source 
Software Hackers: MySQL and Its Dual Licensing, 9 COMPUTER L. REV. & 
TECH. J. 203, 205–07 (2004). Richard Stallman advocates against use of the 
“commercial” terminology as well. Richard M. Stallman, Words to Avoid, in 
FREE SOFTWARE FREE SOCIETY, supra note 17, at 187. 
22 Not surprisingly, the FOSS community refers to BUS code as “non-free” or 
“closed source.” 
23 See NGUYEN ET AL., supra note 8, at 522. 
24 See Robert W. Gomulkiewicz & Mary L. Williamson, A Brief Defense of 
Mass Market Software License Agreements, 22 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L. 
J. 335, 360-61 (1996). 
14 Yale J.L. & Tech. 106 (2011)        2011-2011 
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Despite the differences between FOSS and BUS, they share 
one important characteristic: a copyright on the software code, 
combined with a license of the code, creates the legal framework 
for the transaction model.25 As one prominent open source group 
says: “To stay free, software must be copyrighted and licensed.”26 
FOSS relies on license contracts and so does BUS; they only differ 
in the particular contract terms used.27  
Software developers who license BUS use a wide variety of 
license contracts with their software.28 When it comes to FOSS 
license contracts, the Open Source Initiative has approved over 70 
licenses as complying with the OSD.29 Despite this diversity,30 
most open source programmers use31 either the GPL32 or some 
variation of the BSD License.33  
 
                                                
25 Gomulkiewicz, How Copyleft Uses License Rights, supra note 12, at 185–86, 
189–94. 
26 What Does Free Mean? Or What Do You Mean by Free Software?, DEBIAN 
GROUP, http://www.debian.org/intro/free (last visited May 24, 2011). 
27 There are many similarities in the terms as well, including warranty 
disclaimers, limitations of liability, and choice of law. Gomulkiewicz, How 
Copyleft Uses License Rights, supra note 12, at 185-93 (1999). Indeed, some 
BUS license contracts also grant rights to source code and allow derivative 
works. See NGUYEN ET AL., supra note 8, at 531–32. 
28 The software industry calls these end user license agreements (EULAs) or 
mass-market software licenses; in popular terminology, shrinkwrap or clickwrap 
licenses. See, e.g., Specht v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 306 F.3d 17 (2d Cir. 
2002); Bowers v. Baystate Techs., Inc., 302 F.3d 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2002); ProCD, 
Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996). See generally Robert W. 
Gomulkiewicz, Getting Serious About User-Friendly Mass Market Licensing 
For Software, 12 GEO. MASON L. REV. 687 (2004) [hereinafter Gomulkiewicz, 
Getting Serious]. 
29 Open Source Licenses, OPEN SOURCE INITIATIVE, 
http://www.opensource.org/licenses/index.html (last visited June 24, 2011). 
30 For a discussion of whether this proliferation of licenses represents a positive 
or negative development, see Robert W. Gomulkiewicz, Open Source License 
Proliferation: Helpful Diversity or Hopeless Confusion?, 30 WASH. U. J.L. & 
POL’Y 261(2009) [hereinafter Gomulkiewicz, Open Source License 
Proliferation]. 
31 Evidence of this can be found by checking license use statistics on popular 
open source code repositories such as SourceForge, http://sourceforge.net/ (last 
visited June 24, 2011), and FreshMeat, Statistics, 
http://freshmeat.net/search?q=statistics&submit=Search (last visited June 24, 
2011).  
32 For instance, Linus Torvalds licenses the Linux kernel under GPL 2.0. See 
Steven Vaughan-Nichols, The Linux Operating System Will Remain Under 
Version 2 of the General Public License Rather than Migrate to GPLv3, 
According to the Kernel's Creator, EWEEK.COM (Jan. 26, 2006), 
http://www.eweek.com/c/a/Linux-and-Open-Source/Torvalds-No-GPL-3-for-
Linux/. 
33 In addition, the Apache Foundation licenses its Apache web server under a 
permissive license like the BSD License. 
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B. The Enforceability of Open Source Licenses 
 
Until the Federal Circuit decided Jacobsen v. Katzer, 
hackers and commentators had long debated the enforceability of 
FOSS licenses.34 These debates centered on two aspects of 
enforceability. First, did FOSS licenses hold together as 
enforceable contracts based on their offer, acceptance, and 
consideration? And second, would courts enforce the terms of 
FOSS licenses with injunctive relief? The Federal Circuit answered 
a resounding “yes” to both questions in Jacobsen v. Katzer. 
In addressing whether FOSS licenses hold together as 
enforceable contracts, the Federal Circuit focused on the question 
of whether adequate consideration had been exchanged. The court 
ruled that the exchange of non-monetary consideration easily and 
appropriately provided adequate consideration: “The choice to 
exact consideration in the form of compliance with the open source 
requirements of disclosure and explanation of changes, rather than 
as a dollar-denominated fee, is entitled to no less legal 
recognition.”35 Professors Robert Hillman and Maureen O’Rourke, 
authors of the American Law Institute’s Principles of Software 
Contracts,36 concur that FOSS licenses provide adequate 
consideration to form a contract. 37  
The Jacobsen court did not address the adequacy of the 
licensee’s opportunity to review and manifest assent to the license 
because it was not contested. That is not surprising. In most FOSS 
licensing contexts, notice and assent will not be an issue because 
users of open source code know the ground rules. As such, and in 
light of liberal modern rules of contract formation, most 
commentators agree that FOSS licenses should not be 
unenforceable on grounds of inadequate offer and acceptance.38   
                                                
34 See generally Brian W. Carver, Share and Share Alike: Understanding and 
Enforcing Open Source and Free Software Licenses, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 
443 (2005).  
35 Jacobsen v. Katzer, 535 F.3d 1373, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2008). The open source 
license at issue in the Jacobsen case was the Artistic License which emphasizes 
attribution of the original author’s work and disclosure of changes made to the 
work by subsequent authors. 
36 Am. Law Inst., PRINCIPLES OF SOFTWARE CONTRACTS (2009). See generally 
Maureen A. O’Rourke, An Essay on the Challenges of Drafting a Uniform Law 
of Software Contracting, 10 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 925 (2006). 
37 See Robert A. Hillman & Maureen A. O’Rourke, Rethinking Consideration in 
the Electronic Age, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 311 (2009). 
38 See, e.g., Robert W. Gomulkiewicz, Conditions and Covenants in License 
Contracts: Tales from a Test of the Artistic License, 17 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 
335, 346 (2009) [hereinafter Gomulkiewicz, Conditions and Covenants]; Daniel 
B. Ravicher, Facilitating Collaborative Development: The Enforceability of 
Mass-Market Public Software Licenses, 5 VA. J.L. & TECH. 11, ¶¶ 81-82 (2000); 
Jason B. Wacha, Taking the Case: Is the GPL Enforceable?, 21 SANTA CLARA 
14 Yale J.L. & Tech. 106 (2011)        2011-2011 
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Focusing on the issue of enforcing FOSS licenses via 
injunctive relief, the Federal Circuit ruled that injunctive relief is 
available when a licensee exceeds the scope39 of a license grant.40 
This ruling followed the approach of other U.S. federal courts in 
copyright licensing cases.41 According to the Federal Circuit, 
“[c]opyright licenses are designed to support the right to exclude; 
money damages alone do not support or enforce that right.”42 The 
Federal Circuit explained how injunctive relief is particularly 
appropriate for FOSS licenses where the software is often provided 
to the public at no charge.43 Injunctive relief44 is a particularly 
critical remedy because the standard remedy for breach of contract, 
monetary damages, normally is beside the point in FOSS 
licensing.45 Instead, FOSS licensors hope to prevent further 
copying, distribution, or modification of their software by those 
who fail to abide by open source license terms or, better yet, to 
obtain an affirmative injunction to require public release of the 
                                                                                                         
COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 451, 473-75 (2005). See generally 
Gomulkiewicz, Getting Serious, supra note 28 (describing how, despite 
scholarly criticism, courts generally uphold the enforceability of mass market 
software licenses when licensors provide a reasonable opportunity to review 
license terms and the licensee provides a meaningful manifestation of assent); 
Mark A. Lemley, Terms of Use, 91 MINN. L. REV. 459, 459-60 (2006) (“Every 
court to consider the issue has found ‘clickwrap’ licenses . . . enforceable. A 
majority of courts in the past ten years have enforced shrinkwrap licenses.”).  
39 Examples of exceeding the scope of a license in the open source licensing 
context might include, for example, failing to release source code, failing to 
provide attribution, or failing to specify changes made to the underlying 
software. 
40 Jacobsen, 535 F.3d at1382 (“Indeed, because a calculation of damages is 
inherently speculative, these types of license restrictions might well be rendered 
meaningless absent the ability to enforce through injunctive relief.”). 
41 See, e.g., Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 35 F.3d 1435, 1441 (9th 
Cir. 1994); S.O.S., Inc. v. Payday, Inc., 886 F.2d 1081, 1089 (9th Cir. 1989).  
42 Jacobsen, 535 F.3d at 1381–82.  
43 Id. at 1382. 
44 The licensor might seek other copyright remedies as well, such as 
impoundment or destruction of infringing software, statutory damages, enhanced 
damages for willful infringement, and attorneys’ fees. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 et 
seq. (2006) (describing remedies for copyright infringement). 
45 Making money is not necessarily beside the point. See RICHARD STALLMAN, 
Selling Free Software, in FREE SOFTWARE, FREE SOCIETY, supra note 17, at 65 
(“Many people believe that the spirit of the GNU project is that you should not 
charge money for distributing copies of software, or that you should charge as 
little as possible—just enough to cover the cost. Actually, we encourage people 
who redistribute free software to charge as much as they wish or can . . . . 
Distributing free software is an opportunity to raise funds for development. 
Don’t waste it!”). Open source is now big business for many companies, 
including IBM, Google, RedHat, and Intel. Rather than charge royalties, these 
companies charge for hardware, services, value-added BUS software, and 
advertising. 
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licensee’s source code46 or proper attribution.47 As articulated by 
the Federal Circuit, “these types of license restrictions might be 
rendered meaningless absent the ability to enforce through 
injunctive relief.”48 
 
II. END USER LICENSE AGREEMENTS AND 
COPYRIGHT FIRST SALES: THE VERNOR TEST AND 
ITS INCONVENIENT COMPLICATIONS FOR OPEN 
SOURCE LICENSING 
 
A.  Defining Copyright First Sales  
 
The Supreme Court articulated the copyright first sale 
doctrine in the 1908 case Bobbs-Merrill v. Straus.49 According to 
the Court, a copyright holder’s exclusive right to distribute copies 
ends for any given copy after the owner’s sale of that copy.50 
Congress codified the first sale doctrine the year after Bobbs-
Merrill.51 Now codified in Section 109(a) of the Copyright Act, the 
modern first sale doctrine allows the “owner of a particular copy” 
to sell or dispose of the copy without the copyright holder’s 
permission.52  
The first sale doctrine only applies to owners of copies; it 
does not apply to a person who possesses a copy without owning 
it, such as a licensee.53 A licensee only has permission to use or 
distribute a copy as spelled out in the license agreement. As a 
consequence, a court’s evaluation of whether a given transaction is 
a license or a first sale is critical to determining whether someone 
can claim the benefits54 of the first sale doctrine. But, in practice, 
                                                
46 For example, the GPL requires licensees to publicly release the source code of 
any work based on the licensor’s work, which the licensee distributes. See GNU 
General Public License 2.0, FREE SOFTWARE FOUNDATION, Sections 2 and 3, 
http://www.gnu.org/licenses/gpl-2.0.html (last visited December 24, 2011). 
47 See Jacobsen, 535 F.3d at 1376. 
48 Id. 
49 Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339 (1908). 
50 Id. at 350-51. 
51 17 U.S.C. § 41 (2006). 
52 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2006). 
53 Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc., 621 F.3d 1102, 1107-08 (9th Cir. 2010); see 17 
U.S.C. § 109(d) (2006); Bobbs-Merrill, 210 U.S. at 350; cf. Quality King 
Distribs., Inc. v. L’anza Research Int’l Inc., 523 U.S. 135, 146-47 (1998). 
54 This Article does not delve into the spirited debate about the relative benefits 
of licenses versus first sales. Many commentators have weighed in on that topic. 
See, e.g., Robert W. Gomulkiewicz, The License Is the Product: Comments on 
the Promise of Article 2B for Software and Information Licensing, 13 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 891 (1998) [hereinafter Gomulkiewicz, The License Is the Product]; 
Anne Layne-Farrar, An Economic Defense of Flexibility in IPR Licensing: 
Contracting Around “First Sale” in Multilevel Production Settings, 51 SANTA 
CLARA L. REV. 1149 (2011); Joseph P. Liu, Owning Digital Copies: Copyright 
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this evaluation is difficult to make—not every transaction that a 
software vendor labels as a “license” qualifies and some 
transactions that do not mention the word “license” explicitly still 
should be treated as licenses under the law. Courts have developed 
tests for making the evaluation, and the MDY Trio provides a 
current example. 
 
B. The First Sale Versus EULA Debate 
 
While sales of goods dominated the economy in the 
industrial age, now we live in an information economy dominated 
by software and information products.55 Sales contracts no long 
provide the primary transaction model. Instead, software and 
information producers often use licenses.56 Licenses underlie two 
important aspects of the information economy. First, they enable 
creators and inventors to share intellectual property and collaborate 
in the development of new works and products, from the 
production of complex software to the creation of new multimedia 
works. Second, licensing (including the use of EULAs) enables 
parties of all sizes to bring information products to market through 
many different channels, in a multitude of configurations, and at a 
variety of price points.57 
Despite the importance and ubiquity of licensing in the 
software industry, there has been a long-running debate about the 
enforceability of EULAs. Commentators have criticized EULAs on 
numerous grounds, but despite fierce academic criticism, courts 
have enforced EULAs on a regular basis.58  One aspect of this 
                                                                                                         
Law and the Incidents of Copy Ownership, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1245 
(2001); Raymond T. Nimmer, Copyright First Sale and the Over-Riding Role of 
Contract, 51 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1311 (2011); Aaron Perzanowski & Jason 
Schultz, Digital Exhaustion, 58 UCLA L. REV. 889 (2011); R. Anthony Reese, 
The First Sale Doctrine in the Era of Digital Networks, 44 B.C. L. REV. 577 
(2003); Michael Seringhaus, Comment, E-Book Transactions: Amazon 
“Kindles” the Copy Ownership Debate, 12 YALE J.L. & TECH. 147 (2009); 
Elizabeth I. Winston, Why Sell What You Can License? Contracting Around 
Statutory Protection of Intellectual Property, 14 GEO. MASON L. REV. 93 
(2006). For a pragmatic approach to choosing a license or a first sale as a 
transaction model depending upon the circumstances, see ROBERT W. 
GOMULKIEWICZ, XUAN-THAO NGUYEN & DANIELLE CONWAY, LICENSING 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: LAW & APPLICATION 473-74 (2d ed. 2010). See also 
Vernor, 621 F.3d at 1114-15 (outlining the policy pros and cons of licenses and 
first sales). 
55 NGUYEN ET AL., supra note 8, at 2-3, 511-12. 
56 Id. 
57 Id. 
58 See Gomulkiewicz, Getting Serious, supra note 28 (describing the various 
criticisms of EULAs and showing that, despite scholarly criticism, courts 
generally uphold the enforceability of mass market software licenses when 
licensors provide a reasonable opportunity to review license terms and the 
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debate relates to whether EULAs simply can be ignored because 
mass-market software transactions really amount to first sales 
rather than licenses.59 Whether this claim is correct, categorically 
or in any given case, depends on the test for determining whether a 
EULA-based transaction presents a license or first sale 
transaction.60 
The “is it really a license?” issue arises in a variety of 
contexts in the software industry,61 three of which are useful to 
highlight for purposes of providing background for the MDY Trio. 
Some of the earliest cases arose in what I will call the 
“unbundling” context. Some software publishers distribute 
packages or suites of software at a discount compared to the price 
of the individual components. Sometimes a party in the chain of 
distribution unbundles the software packages to sell the 
components separately, hoping to profit from the higher prices that 
can be charged for the individual components. Software vendors 
use license contracts to prevent this unbundling. Courts have 
enforced these licenses on many occasions62 although not when the 
transaction more resembled a first sale than a license.63   
A second context deals with limitations placed on software 
use. A common example is discounted software licensed for 
academic use only.64 Another common example is software 
                                                                                                         
licensee provides a meaningful manifestation of assent); Lemley, supra note 39, 
at 459-60 (“Every court to consider the issue has found ‘clickwrap’ licenses . . . 
enforceable. A majority of courts in the past ten years have enforced shrinkwrap 
licenses.”).  
59 See Vernor, 621 F.3d at 1106-07. 
60 See infra for a discussion of the MDY Trio’s test. 
61 Increasingly, patent law’s “first sale” doctrine, known as “patent exhaustion,” 
has become important in software licensing transactions. See Quanta Computer, 
Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc., 128 S.Ct. 2109 (2008); see also Robert W. 
Gomulkiewicz, The Federal Circuit’s Licensing Law Jurisprudence: Its Nature 
and Influence, 84 WASH. L. REV. 199 (2009) [hereinafter Gomulkiewicz, 
Licensing Law Jurisprudence] (analyzing the Quanta case in the context of the 
license transaction at issue); Amelia S. Rinehart, Contracting Patents: Modern 
Patent Exhaustion Doctrine, 23 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 483 (2010). 
62 See, e.g., Apple, Inc., v. Pystar Corp., 92 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1917 (N.D. Cal. 2009); 
Adobe Sys. Inc. v. Stargate Software, Inc., 84 F. Supp. 2d 1086 (N.D. Cal. 
2000); Microsoft Corp. v. Grey Computer, 910 F. Supp. 1077 (D. Md. 1995) 
(unbundling operating system software from computer hardware); Microsoft 
Corp. v. Harmony Computers & Electronics, In., 846 F. Supp. 208 (E.D.N.Y. 
1994) (same). 
63 See, e.g., SoftMan Products Co. v. Adobe Sys. Inc., 171 F. Supp. 2d 1075 
(C.D. Cal. 2001). Sophisticated software publishers can avoid the result in 
SoftMan by observing more careful and robust licensing practices, as outlined 
for example in the Stargate case. See generally Christian H. Nadan, Software 
Licensing in the 21st Century: Are Software “Licenses” Really Sales and How 
Will the Software Industry Respond?, 32 AIPLA Q.J. 555 (2004) (commenting 
on the practical implications of the SoftMan and Stargate cases). 
64 See NGUYEN ET AL., supra note 8, at 20-21. 
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licensed at one price for business use and at a lower price for 
personal use.65 And a final example is software licensed for 
evaluation purposes only.66 The litigation in MDY Industries v. 
Blizzard Entertainment arose in the context of use restrictions in 
Blizzard Entertainment’s EULA for its software and online gaming 
service. In MDY, the license prohibited World of Warcraft gamers 
from using robots to play the game in order to advance to higher 
game levels and acquire additional game assets.67 If the software 
had been sold as a copyright first sale rather than licensed, then the 
end user could ignore the use limitations.68 
A third context concerns EULA restrictions imposed on end 
user redistribution of the software. These restrictions are often 
placed on high priced software;69 EULAs for many consumer-
oriented, mass-market software products allow redistribution (so 
long as the original user does not keep a copy).70 If a software 
transaction is fundamentally a first sale rather than a license, then 
the software may be freely transferred even if a EULA purports to 
say otherwise. The dispute in Vernor v. Autodesk arose in this 
context. We turn now to the Vernor case because that is where the 
Ninth Circuit announced its test for distinguishing between 
licenses and first sales, with its inconvenient complications for 
open source licensing. 
 
C. The MDY Trio’s License Test and Its Inconvenient 
Complications for Open Source Licensing 
 
1. Vernor v. Autodesk’s Test For Distinguishing First 
Sales From Licenses 
 
Autodesk, Inc. develops computer-aided design software 
called “AutoCAD” which is used by manufacturers, architects, and 
engineers. Autodesk provides AutoCAD to its customers pursuant 
to a EULA. This license prohibits transfer of the software without 
Autodesk’s permission.71 Without permission, one of Autodesk’s 
customers sold copies of AutoCAD to Mr. Vernor who, in turn, re-
                                                
65 See ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996). 
66 See Arizona Retail Sys. Inc. v. Software Link, Inc., 831 F. Supp. 759 (D. Ariz. 
1993); cf. UMG Recordings v. Augusto, 628 F.3d 1175 (9th Cir. 2011) (music 
CD sent for evaluation purposes). 
67 MDY Industries v. Blizzard Entertainment, 629 F.3d 928, 935 (9th Cir. 2010). 
68 Note that there was no issue about notice of or assent to the EULA. MDY, 629 
F.3d at 928. The sole defense was that the EULA could be ignored because of 
the first sale doctrine. 
69 See Vernor v. Autodesk, 621 F.3d 1102, 1106-07 (9th Cir. 2010) (regarding 
the AutoCAD software at issue). 
70 See Gomulkiewicz & Williamson, supra note 24, at 357 n.89. 
71 Vernor, 621 F.3d at 1105.  
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sold the copies on eBay. Litigation ensued and Mr. Vernor 
argued72 that Autodesk could not enforce its prohibition on the 
transfer of copies of AutoCAD because Autodesk’s right to control 
distribution was exhausted under the first sale doctrine.73 The 
District Court agreed with Mr. Vernor, but the Ninth Circuit 
reversed, relying on its MAI Trio of cases.  
The Ninth Circuit spelled out the distinction between a 
license and a first sale in two separate parts of its opinion. In the 
first instance, the court read its United States v. Wise74 and the MAI 
Trio precedents to “prescribe three considerations that we may use 
to determine whether a software user is a licensee, rather than an 
owner of a copy.”75 The court went on to list the considerations: 
“First, we consider whether the copyright owner specifies that a 
user is granted a license. Second, we consider whether the 
copyright owner significantly restricts the user’s ability to transfer 
the software. Finally, we consider whether the copyright owner 
imposes notable use restrictions.”76 Later in the opinion, the court 
recapitulated these considerations, seemingly turning them into a 
test: “We hold today that a software user is a licensee rather than 
an owner of a copy where the copyright owner: (1) specifies that 
the user is granted a license; (2) significantly restricts the user’s 
ability to transfer the software; and (3) imposes notable use 
restrictions.”77  
Although unnecessary to the resolution of the case, the court 
noted that the legislative history of both Section 109 and Section 
117 of the Copyright Act supported its conclusion.78 It also 
rejected the argument that Bobbs-Merrill79, the common law 
predecessor to Section 109(a), compelled a different conclusion:  
 
Decided in 1908, Bobbs-Merrill did not and could not 
address the question of whether the right to use 
software is distinct from the ownership of copies of 
software. Moreover, the Supreme Court in Bobbs-
Merrill made it explicit that its decision did not 
address the use of restrictions to create a license.80  
                                                
72 Note that Mr. Vernor was aware of AutoCAD’s EULA so there was no 
argument that he lacked notice of the license terms. Vernor, 621 F.3d at 1105. 
73 Id.  
74 United States v. Wise, 550 F.2d 1180 (9th Cir. 1977). 
75 Vernor, 621 F.3d at 1110-1111. 
76 Id. 
77 Id. at 1111. 
78 .Id. at 1112. 
79 Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339 (1908). 
80 Vernor, 621 F.3d at 1114. Cf. Quality King Distribs., Inc. v. L’anza Research 
Int’l, Inc., 523 U.S. 135, 146-47 (1998) (“[T]he first sale doctrine would not 
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Finally, the court noted that both sides had mustered 
important policy arguments in favor of their positions, but that 
these arguments “do not alter our conclusion that our precedent 
from Wise through the MAI Trio requires the result we reach.”81 
 
2. Inconvenient Complications for Open Source 
Licensing  
 
At first glance, Vernor’s license test works well for many 
software licensors. Most BUS licensors provide their software 
under license models that readily fall within the Ninth Circuit’s 
definition of a license transaction. Indeed, the court found that 
Autodesk’s license met its definition.82 However, complications 
arise for open source licensing.  
FOSS licenses do not “significantly restrict” the user’s 
ability to transfer the software.83 Open source licensing does not 
restrict transfer at all; in fact, FOSS licenses affirmatively grant the 
unencumbered freedom to transfer the software.84 Free 
transferability of software, in both source and object code forms, 
lies at the very heart of open source licensing.85 
In addition, FOSS licenses do not “impose notable use 
restrictions.” For instance, the GPL says that it does not limit use 
in any way.86 The BSD license essentially tells the licensee “you 
can do anything you want with the software” and does not restrict 
use in any way, shape or form.87 
The basic flaw in the Vernor license test is that it assumes 
software licenses only grant fewer rights than a first sale would 
                                                                                                         
provide a defense to a §602(a) action against any non owner such as a bailee, a 
licensee, a consignee, or one whose possession of the copy was unlawful.”). 
81 Vernor, 621 F.3d at 1115. 
82 By contrast, a music company’s attempt to “license” promotional CDs did not 
meet the test. See UMG Recordings v. Augusto, 628 F.3d at 1179-83. 
83 This may also be a complication for BUS. As mentioned, many BUS licenses 
permit transfer of the software although the transfer often comes with certain 
conditions that could be called restrictions, such as the condition that the 
transferor inform the transferee of the terms of the license, that the transferee 
agrees to abide by the terms of the license, and that the transferor transfer all 
physical copies and documentation to the transferee. Do these conditions 
“significantly restrict” the ability to transfer BUS licenses? The answer seems to 
be “yes” based on the Ninth Circuit’s decision in MDY Industries. See MDY 
Industries v. Blizzard Entertainment, 629 F.3d 928, 938-39 (9th Cir. 2010) 
(emphasis added). 
84 See THE OPEN SOURCE DEFINITION, supra note 14, at Section 1. 
85 Id. 
86 See GPL 2.0, supra note 46, at section 0; GNU General Public License 
Version 3, FREE SOFTWARE FOUNDATION, Section 2, 
http://www.gnu.org/licenses/gpl.txt (last visited May 24, 2011). 
87 See Gomulkiewicz, Debugging, supra note 18, at 93. 
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provide. A first sale, of course, is not a sale of the copyright itself 
and can best be characterized as a limited license, namely 
permission to use and redistribute one copy of a work.88 Often 
software licenses grant more rights than a first sale would provide; 
open source licensing presents the classic case. Even in BUS 
licensing, the license tends to provide a package of rights, in some 
respects granting less than first sale rights (e.g., by restricting use 
or transferability) and in other respects granting more than first 
sale rights (e.g., rights to create derivatives or make additional 
copies).89 
The best way to reconcile the Vernor test with FOSS 
licensing is to read the Vernor license test as one way, but not the 
only way, to prove that a transaction is a license. In other words, if 
a transaction meets the Vernor test it certainly qualifies as a 
license; however, there may be other ways to demonstrate that a 
transaction is a license, such as by showing that the user received 
permission to exercise more copyrights than the user would have 
under a first sale. If the user gets more rights, then clearly the 
transaction is not a first sale. This interpretation of the license test 
is consistent with language in the early part of the Vernor opinion, 
which sets out “three considerations that we may use to determine 
whether a software user is a licensee” (emphasis added). Perhaps 
that is precisely what the Vernor court intended90—but even if it 
did not, that seems the better approach for future Ninth Circuit 
panels and other Circuits to adopt. 
In practice, the mismatch between FOSS license principles 
and the Vernor license definition probably amounts to a 
complication in theory only for FOSS licensors. Defendants raise 
first sale as a defense in lawsuits in which the plaintiff challenges a 
user’s unauthorized distribution or use of its software. Rarely, if 
ever, will a defendant need to assert a first sale defense in an FOSS 
licensing context because these licenses grant unbounded rights to 
use and transfer the software. Nonetheless, the open source 
complication helpfully illustrates that the Vernor license test will 
prove inadequate in many software licensing contexts. End user 
software licenses provide a more complex transaction model than 
the court’s test accounts for.91  
                                                
88 In the software context, 17 U.S.C. § 117 (2006) provides additional rights 
relating to archival copies and copies made as an essential step to using the 
software. 
89 See Robert W. Gomulkiewicz, The License Is the Product, supra note 54; 
Gomulkiewicz & Williamson, supra note 24.  
90 See Nimmer, supra note 54, at 1341. 
91 As more software and information transactions occur digitally and do not 
involve physical copies (e.g., cloud computing), some scholars predict that the 
first sale doctrine will become less and less relevant as time goes by. See Aaron 
Perzanoski & Jason Schultz, Digital Exhaustion, 58 UCLA L. REV. 889 (2011). 
14 Yale J.L. & Tech. 106 (2011)        2011-2011 
 124 
From a policy point of view, the Vernor case continues the 
trend followed by most courts in the United States of upholding a 
software developer’s ability to use mass market end user licensing 
as a transaction model92 rather than characterizing most end user 
transactions as copyright first sales as urged by some scholars.93 
Indeed, FOSS licensing is but one of the many valuable software 
licensing practices that benefit from a policy that upholds licensing 
as a transaction model. Of course, as demonstrated by the UMG 
Recordings v. Augusto case in the MDY Trio, not all transactions 
bearing the “license” label will or should be so characterized.94 
However, many software licenses will meet the Vernor test (as 
modified by my proposal above), thus enabling flexibility, 
diversity, and choice in the software industry, including the 
creative distribution and collaboration models provided by FOSS 
licensing. As the court put it in Jacobsen v. Katzer, “[o]pen source 
licensing has become a widely used method of creative 
collaboration that serves to advance the arts and sciences in a 
manner and at a pace that few could have imagined a few decades 
ago.”95 
 
III. MDY’S DISTINCTION BETWEEN COVENANTS AND 
CONDITION: INCONVENIENT AND DIRE 
COMPLICATIONS FOR OPEN SOURCE LICENSING  
 
While the Vernor license test may be an inconvenient 
complication for FOSS licensing in name only, the MDY case’s 
complication related to the covenant/condition distinction is dire. 
Breach of a license condition differs from breach of a pure 
                                                
92 See, e.g., Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393 (2d Cir. 2004); 
Bowers v. Baystate Tech., Inc., 320 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Specht v. 
Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 306 F.3d 17 (2d Cir. 2002); Micro Star v. Formgen 
Inc., 154 F.3d 1107 (9th Cir. 1998); ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 
1455 (7th Cir. 1996); Adobe Sys., Inc. v. Stargate Software, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 
2d 1051 (N.D. Cal. 2002); i.Lan Sys., Inc. v. Netscout Serv. Level Corp., 183 F. 
Supp. 2d 328 (D. Mass. 2002); Storm Impact, Inc. v. Software of the Month 
Club, 13 F. Supp. 2d 782 (N.D. Ill. 1998); Ariz. Retail Sys., Inc. v. Software 
Link, Inc., 831 F. Supp. 759 (D. Ariz. 1993); I-A Equip. Co., Inc. v. I-Code, 
Inc., 43 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 807 (Mass. Dist. Ct. 2000); M.A. Mortenson Co., 
Inc. v. Timberline Software Corp., 140 Wash. 2d 568, 998 P.2d 305 (2000). 
93 E.g., John A. Rothchild, The Incredible Shrinking First Sale Rule: Are 
Software Resale Limits Lawful?, 57 RUTGERS L. REV. 1 (2004); Winston, supra 
note 54; see also Cody Gillians, Recent Development, Is This Mine or Yours? 
The Effect of the Rulings in Vernor v. Autodesk and The Library of Congress on 
the Determination of Who Owns Software Copies, 12 N.C. J. L. & TECH. 205 
(2010) (criticizing the Vernor court’s approach to the license/first sale 
distinction because it makes it easier to characterize transactions as licenses). 
94 See UMG Recordings v. Augusto, 628 F.3d at 1179-83. 
95 535 F.3d 1373, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
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contractual covenant because when a licensee fails to abide by a 
license condition, the licensee not only breaches the software 
contract, but also infringes the licensor’s intellectual property 
rights.96  Thus, the distinction between license conditions and pure 
contractual covenants97 affects whether a FOSS licensor can get 
copyright remedies, especially injunctive relief, the critical remedy 
in most open source settings. Jacobsen v. Katzer did not provide 
much guidance on when a license term falls into one category or 
the other.98 Most importantly, the court did not address the extent 
to which the parties, by careful drafting, can dictate or influence 
the categorization.99 This Section describes the general distinction 
between contractual covenants and license conditions. Then, it sets 
out the MDY case’s approach to making the distinction. Finally, the 
Section critiques the MDY approach and argues for the adoption of 
a different framework. 
 
A. Illustrating the Distinction Between Contractual 
Covenants and License Conditions 
 
Software contracts contain a collection of terms that 
describe the contractual relationship between a licensor and 
licensee with respect to the licensor’s software. We normally call 
this entire contract a “license” but, to be more precise, we should 
call it a “license contract” because it contains not only a 
permission-granting license100 but also other contractual terms 
such as choice of law, payment, and warranties.101 The license 
grant portion of the contract consists of both a grant of rights under 
the licensor’s intellectual property and any conditions that the 
licensor chooses to impose on that grant. These license conditions 
create the parameters for exploitation of the licensor’s intellectual 
property rights.  
                                                
96 See, e.g., Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 35 F.3d 1435, 1441 (9th 
Cir. 1994); S.O.S., Inc. v. Payday, Inc., 886 F.2d 1081, 1089 (9th Cir. 1989); 
Fantastic Fakes, Inc. v. Pickwick Int’l, Inc., 661 F.2d 479, 483–84 (5th Cir. 
1981). 
97 See generally Yamini Menon, Jacobsen Revisited: Conditions, Covenants, 
and the Future of Open Source Licensing, 7 WASH. J.L. TECH. & ARTS 311 
(2011). 
98 The final word from the Jacobsen v. Katzer court on the distinction is, 
essentially, that context matters. Referring to an attribution requirement, the 
court in a footnote said that failure to provide attribution only triggers a 
copyright infringement if so provided in the license. Jacobsen, 535 F.3d at 1382 
n.5. 
99 I discussed this issue at length in an article published before the court decided 
the MDY Trio. See Gomulkiewicz, Conditions and Covenants, supra note 38. 
100 See Tips v. U.S., 70 F.2d 525, 526-27 (5th Cir. 1934) (license is a 
“permission”). 
101 See Gomulkiewicz, Conditions and Covenants, supra note 38, at 346. 
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Sometimes identifying a license condition will be easy. 
Many complex license contracts have an entire section devoted to 
describing license conditions and the section is labeled as such. 
Often license drafters use words such as “provided that,” “only if,” 
or “on condition that” to signify that the license grant contains 
conditions.102 For example, the BSD License’s license grant states, 
“Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or 
without modification, are permitted provided that the following 
conditions are met . . . .” The “share alike” license grant of GPL 
2.0 states, “You may modify your copy or copies of the Program or 
any portion of it . . . and copy and distribute such modifications or 
work under the terms of Section 1 above, provided that you also 
meet all these conditions . . . .”103  
Other terms in license contracts clearly are identifiable as 
pure covenants because they do not bear directly on the grant of 
rights. As mentioned previously, choice of law clauses, payment 
provisions, and warranties and disclaimers of warranty typically 
fall into the category of contractual covenants. An interesting open 
source-related example comes from the newest version of the GPL, 
GPL 3.0 (GPLv3).104 GPLv3 contains a provision whose purpose 
is to thwart the use of digital rights management (DRM) 
technology.105 Let’s call this the “Anti-DRM Section.” The Anti-
DRM Section follows a provision labeled “2. Basic Permissions” 
and comes before provisions labeled “4. Conveying Verbatim 
Copies,” “5. Conveying Modified Source Versions,” and “6. 
Conveying Non-Source Forms.”106 The latter four provisions 
clearly read like license grants with accompanying license 
conditions. The Anti-DRM Section, though nested in the midst of 
licenses, is not connected to the licenses in any obvious way.107 
Thus, it appears to be a standalone contractual covenant.  
                                                
102 See id. at 348. 
103 GNU General Public License 2.0, supra note 46, at Section 2. 
104 See Clark D. Asay, The General Public License Version 3.0: Making or 
Breaking the FOSS Movement?, 14 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 265 
(2008); Robert W. Gomulkiewicz, A First Look at General Public License 3.0, 
24 COMPUTER & INTERNET L. 15 (2007). 
105 See GNU General Public License Version 3, supra note 86, at Section 3. 
106 Id. at Sections 2, 4–6. 
107 One possibility is that Section 8, “Termination,” ties the DRM Clause to the 
license grants. It provides: “You may not propagate or modify a covered work 
except as expressly provided under this License. Any attempt otherwise to 
propagate or modify it is void, and will automatically terminate your rights 
under this License (including any patent licenses granted under the third 
paragraph of section 11).” GNU General Public License Version 3, supra note 
105, at Section 8. However, the best reading of this provision is that it is simply 
a garden variety termination provision, providing that, in the event the licensee 
breaches the license contract, the licensee has no further rights to exercise the 
rights granted in the license grant provisions. Another possibility is Section 9, 
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Sometimes the license contract’s plain wording does not 
clearly identify whether a particular provision is a license 
condition or a pure covenant.108 In that situation, courts will try to 
determine the intent of the parties.109 If in doubt, however, courts 
presume that a provision is a pure covenant rather than a license 
condition.110  
Sometimes the issue is not ambiguity—it’s that very clear 
drafting has framed a provision that is normally a pure covenant as 
a license condition. To illustrate, assume that the Free Software 
Foundation (“FSF”) decided to revise the current Anti-DRM 
Section by adding the following language to the Anti-DRM clause: 
“The licenses in Sections 2, 4, 5, and 6 are expressly conditioned 
on your compliance with the terms and conditions of Section 3 
[The Anti-DRM Section].” On the surface, the FSF has re-drafted a 
pure covenant into a license condition.  
Consider a second illustration concerning royalty-related 
provisions.111 A BUS license may contain a term that requires 
payment of a certain royalty. By contrast, some FOSS licenses 
prohibit royalties, such as GPLv3 in its § 10. Both of these royalty-
related provisions normally would be considered contractual 
covenants. However, the license contract could be drafted to make 
the license grant conditional on either the payment or non-payment 
of royalties. In the context of a hypothetical BUS license: “Subject 
to the timely payment of royalties under the license contract, 
                                                                                                         
“Acceptance Not Required for Having Copies.” Midway through Section 9 it 
says, “However, nothing other than this License grants you permission to 
propagate or modify any covered work. These actions infringe copyright if you 
do not accept this License. Therefore, by modifying or propagating a covered 
work, you indicate your acceptance of this License to do so.” Id. at § 9. In 
context, the best reading of this provision is that it serves three purposes: first, it 
explains what actions signify manifestation of assent to the license contract; 
second, it explains the consequences if you do not manifest assent; and third, it 
serves as friendly advice that no license is needed to simply receive or run the 
software.  
108 See Harmon Cable Comm. v. Scope Cable Television, 468 N.W.2d 350, 358 
(Neb. 1991) (“Courts have struggled for centuries with differentiating between 
conditions and promises.”). 
109 See, e.g., Henning v. Mainstreet Bank, 538F.3d 975, 978 (8th Cir. 2008). See 
also Jacobsen v. Katzer, 535 F.3d 1373, 1382 n.5 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (noting that 
context matters). 
110 See Grand Union Co. v. Cord Meyer Dev. Co., 761 F.2d 141, 146-47 (2d Cir. 
1985). 
111 Normally “permission precedes payment.” Madison River Mgmt. Co. v. Bus. 
Mgmt. Software Corp., 387 F. Supp. 2d 521, 534 (M.D.N.C. 2005); see also 
Graham v. James, 144 F.3d 229, 237 (2d Cir. 1998); Jacob Maxwell, Inc. v. 
Veeck, 110 F.3d 749, 753–54 (11th Cir. 1997). 
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licensor grants you the following rights . . . .”112 Or, in the context 
of a re-drafted GPLv3: “Sections 2, 4, 5, and 6 are expressly 
conditioned on your compliance with the requirements in Section 
10.” Taken at face value, clever drafting successfully changed 
these royalty-related covenants into a license conditions.  
It is against this complex backdrop that the Ninth Circuit in 
the MDY case created its test for distinguishing between pure 
covenants and license conditions. Next, we turn to the MDY case 
and its test, followed by a critique of that test and a proposal for a 
different approach. 
 
B. MDY’s Approach to the Covenant/Condition 
Distinction and Its Complications 
 
In the MDY case, the court examined whether the 
defendant’s violation of Blizzard Entertainment’s EULA (which 
governs its World of Warcraft software) and its Terms of Use 
(which govern the corresponding online gaming service) infringed 
Blizzard’s copyrights. The court’s decision turned, in part, on 
whether the EULA or TOS terms that the defendant violated were 
contractual covenants or license conditions.113 
The court held that copyright infringement may occur “only 
where the licensee’s action (1) exceeds the license’s scope (2) in a 
manner that implicates one of the licensor’s exclusive statutory 
rights.”114 Addressing purported license grant conditions, the court 
went on to conclude that “for a licensee’s violation of a contract to 
constitute copyright infringement, there must be a nexus between 
the [license] condition and the licensor’s exclusive rights under 
copyright.”115 The court emphasized the need to ground copyright 
infringement in this way: to hold otherwise would allow any 
software copyright holder to “designate any disfavored conduct 
during software use as copyright infringement by purporting to 
condition the license on the [licensee’s] abstention from the 
disfavored conduct.”116 
Many purported license conditions in FOSS licenses would 
not be classified as such under the MDY approach, even though the 
license drafters clearly intended to treat them as license conditions 
and they are fundamental to open source licensing. For example, 
                                                
112 See McRoberts Software, Inc. v. Media 100, Inc., 329 F.3d 557, 562 (7th Cir. 
2003) (concerning a license grant that provided: “subject to [Media 100] timely 
paying all amounts owing hereunder, upon payment of the $75,000 license fee”). 
113 MDY Industries v. Blizzard Entertainment, 629 F.3d 928, 939 (9th Cir. 
2010). 
114 Id. at 940. 
115 Id. at 941. 
116 Id. 
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the Artistic License 1.0’s attribution conditions arguably fall into a 
gray area because they relate to moral rights117 but not directly to 
copying, distribution, or derivative works. Many of the “share 
alike” provisions of the GPL might not qualify—they do not 
invoke copyrights, and instead simply require a set of reciprocal 
promises118 given in exchange for a broad license of all copyrights 
(the so-called copyleft which reverses all copyrights).  And finally, 
it is hard to see how the BSD License’s condition that a licensee 
reproduce warranty disclaimers or, for that matter, its condition 
that the licensee reproduce copyright notices would qualify as a 
license condition, because neither of those terms have a nexus to 
“exclusive rights” under copyright as required by MDY.119 
Software presents a unique complication for identifying the 
nexus between a purported license condition and an exclusive 
copyright because software’s very use causes multiple copies to be 
made in a computer’s random access memory (RAM). If the user 
acquires the software as a copyright first sale, Section 117 of the 
U.S. Copyright Act provides that these RAM copies are not 
infringing. By contrast, in a license transaction, the license contract 
governs the making of these RAM copies during software use, so 
any properly drafted condition on the license grant could be 
characterized as a copyright-implicating license condition. In other 
words, in the software context, the parties could have considerable 
flexibility about whether to characterize a term as a covenant or a 
condition. 
Rather than wrestle deeply with this issue,120 the MDY court 
brushed it off with a terse policy observation: “The rationale would 
                                                
117 Protection of moral rights under copyright law is relatively weak in the 
United States, relating primarily to the visual arts. See 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER 
& DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT 8D.02[D][2] (2005); see also IRINI 
A. STAMATOUDI, COPYRIGHT AND MULTIMEDIA PRODUCTS: A COMPARATIVE 
ANALYSIS 160–64 (2002) (discussing varied treatment of moral rights as they 
relate to software); MIRA T. SUNDARA RAJAN, MORAL RIGHTS 283-318 (2011) 
(same). 
118 For example, in exchange for the license grant, the licensee agrees to release 
source code and relicense royalty free on the same terms as the GPL. While 
these conditions do have something to do with copyright, they do not place 
direct conditions on copying, distribution, or the creation of derivative works.  
119 See MDY, 629 F.3d at 941; see also Fantastic Fakes, Inc. v. Pickwick Int’l, 
Inc., 661 F.2d 479, 487 (5th Cir. 1981). But see County of Ventura v. Blackburn, 
362 F.2d 515, 520 (9th Cir. 1966); National Comics Publications v. Fawcett 
Publications, 191 F.2d 594, 600 (2d Cir. 1951). In addition, the requirement to 
retain copyright notices may be largely superfluous after passage of 17 U.S.C. § 
1202 (b), which prohibits the removal of copyright management information 
such as copyright notices. 
120 For example, the court could have revisited the oft-criticized MAI Systems v. 
Peak Computer decision, which treats RAM copies as infringing copies. See 
Cartoon Network v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2008); Melissa 
A. Bogden, Comment, Fixing Fixation: The RAM Copy Doctrine, 43 ARIZ. ST. 
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be that because the conduct occurs while the [licensee’s] computer 
is copying the software code into RAM in order for it to run, the 
violation is copyright infringement. This would allow software 
copyright owners far greater rights than Congress has generally 
conferred on copyright owners.”121 Taken literally, this observation 
is not correct. Software copyright holders who use licenses simply 
do not have “greater rights” than other copyright holders—all 
possess the same exclusive statutory rights and the same remedies 
for breach of those rights.  
To be fair, perhaps the MDY court is suggesting that 
software licensors may have a greater ability to enforce their 
copyrights for breach of a license contract if they have greater 
flexibility to create license conditions than other copyright 
licensors. The critical word, however, is “may.” Remedies 
ultimately come down to what a court will award, especially when 
it comes to affirmative or emergency injunctive relief. If courts 
exercise caution in granting injunctive relief122 for breach of a 
license condition that is not well grounded in copyright law or 
policy, then, in practice, software copyright holders will have little 
or no greater power than other copyright holders.  
To complicate matters further, the MDY court carved out a 
sui generis exception for monetary payments: “A licensee arguably 
may commit copyright infringement by continuing to use the 
licensed work while failing to make required payments, even 
though a failure to make payments otherwise lacks a nexus to the 
licensor’s exclusive statutory rights.”123 The court justified its 
exception “because of the distinct nexus between payment and all 
commercial copyright licenses, not just those concerning 
software.”124  
The court appears to be saying that license grants which are 
conditioned on the payment of money may be remedied by 
copyright remedies even though payments are not grounded in 
copyright’s exclusive rights. The court’s rationale for its sui 
generis exception is a bit obscure because it uses the word “nexus” 
twice but in two different senses. The best reading seems to be that 
if all copyright licenses (software as well as non-software) could 
benefit from conditioning license grants on payment, then the 
                                                                                                         
L.J. 181 (2011); Daniel J. Buller, Note, Copyright Infringement in the Ether: 
RAM Buffering and the Copyright Act’s Duration Requirement, 59 U. KANS. L. 
REV. 659 (2011); Aaron Perzanowski, Fixing RAM Copies, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 
1067 (2010). 
121 MDY, 629 F.3d at 941. 
122 Or any other copyright remedies, for that matter. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 502-505 
(2006) (describing remedies such as statutory damages, seizure of infringing 
copies, and attorneys’ fees). 
123 MDY, 629 F.3d at 941 n.4. 
124 Id. 
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court’s concern about “far greater rights” accruing to software 
licensors would not come into play. However, software and non-
software commercial copyright licenses share many terms in 
common, not just payment.125 Under the court’s reasoning could 
these “in common” terms also be drafted as copyright-invoking 
license conditions?  
Moreover, the court’s sui generis exception disfavors 
licenses, such as FOSS licenses,126 for which payment is not the 
operative consideration. After MDY, parties can draft a license so 
that the payment of royalties is treated as a license condition,127 but 
they cannot draft a license where “payment” of non-monetary 
consideration (such as attribution or “share alike”) is a license 
condition.128 Neither contract nor copyright policy justifies 
favoring monetary consideration over non-monetary 
consideration.129 Such a distinction even runs afoul of the court’s 
concern about giving some copyright licensors “far greater rights” 
than others, but, ironically, the court’s exception favors 
commercial non-software licensors over non-commercial open 
source software licensors. 
 
C. A Multifactor, Sliding Scale Approach that 
Addresses the MDY Complication 
 
The Ninth Circuit’s attempt to limit the ability of copyright 
licensors to turn contractual covenants into license conditions is 
based on a sound policy concern, namely the fear of unduly 
extending copyright’s power through contracts, especially in the 
context of software licenses. Unfortunately, the court’s approach 
encroaches on three competing policies, namely authorial control, 
certainty in contracting, and the freedom of contracting parties to 
structure their transactions and allocate risk as they think best 
under the circumstances.  There is a better way to balance all of 
these important copyright and contract policies.  
                                                
125 See generally GOMULKIEWICZ ET AL., supra note 54, at 51-80 (chapter 
discussing terms common in most license contracts). 
126 “There are substantial benefits, including economic benefits, to the creation 
and distribution of copyrighted works under public licenses that range far 
beyond traditional license royalties.” Jacobsen v. Katzer, 535 F.3d 1373, 1378 
(Fed. Cir. 2008). 
127 See McRoberts Software, Inc. v. Media 100, Inc., 329 F.3d 557, 562 (7th Cir. 
2003) (“[S]ubject to [Media 100] timely paying all amounts owing hereunder, 
upon payment of the $75,000 license fee. . . .”). 
128 Furthermore, it is doubtful that a licensor could create a license condition 
based on a promise not to charge a royalty such as the critical license condition 
of this nature found in the GPL. 
129 Jacobsen, 535 F.3d at 1382. 
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The difficulty with the MDY approach is that it places so 
much emphasis on identifying the absolute definitional boundary 
between contractual covenants and license conditions,130 
determined by examining the “grounding” in or “nexus” with 
copyright’s exclusive rights. The trial court faces a high stakes 
“either/or” choice based on relatively sketchy criteria; if the court 
lands on the side of defining a given license agreement term as a 
contractual covenant, the copyright holder cannot receive 
injunctive relief.131  
There is a better way to utilize the “grounding” and “nexus” 
criteria identified in the MDY decision. The better approach is to 
shift the focus to the remedies aspect of the case. Leading up to 
and following the Supreme Court’s decision in eBay v. 
MercExchange,132 there has been a renewed appreciation for the 
impact of remedies in intellectual property cases,133 particularly as 
they relate to maintaining a fair balance in the intellectual property 
bargain between exclusive rights and public use.134 I propose what 
I will call a “sliding scale” approach to contrast it with the MDY 
court’s “either/or” approach, applied when a licensor seeks 
injunctive relief. 
It makes more sense for courts to use the “grounding” and 
“nexus” criteria as critical factors in deciding whether to grant 
injunctive relief, based on a sliding scale. Indeed, this is precisely 
                                                
130 Determining this boundary is notoriously difficult. See MELVILLE B. NIMMER 
& DAVID NIMMER, 3 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT 12.01[A] at 12-5 (2010); Omri 
Ben-Shahar, Damages For Unlicensed Use, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 7, 11-13 (2011). 
131 See David McGowan, The Tory Anarchism of F/OSS Licensing, 78 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 207, 216 (2010) [hereinafter McGown, Tory Anarchism] (pointing out the 
issue in harkening back to and criticizing the 9th Circuit’s decision in Sun 
Microsystems v. Microsoft Corp., 188 F.3d 1115 (9th Cir. 1999)).  
132 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006). 
133 See Orit F. Afori, Flexible Remedies as a Means to Counteract Failures in 
Copyright Law, 29 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1 (2011).  
134 See, e.g., Omri Ben-Shahar, supra note 130; Engey Elrefaie, Injunctive Relief 
Post eBay and the Various Applications of the Four-Factor Test in Differing 
Technological Industries, 2 HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L.J. 219, 239 (2010); H. 
Tomas Gomez-Arostegui, What History Teaches Us About Copyright 
Injunctions and the Inadequate-Remedy-At-Law Requirement, 81 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 1197 (2008) (arguing that the historical record suggests that in copyright 
cases legal remedies (damages) were deemed categorically inadequate); David 
McGowan, Irreparable Harm, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 577 (2010) 
[hereinafter McGowan, Irreparable Harm]; ; Jake Phillips, Comment, eBay’s 
Effect on Copyright Injunctions: When Property Rules Give Way to Liability 
Rules, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 405 (2008); Pamela Samuelson & Krzystof 
Bebenek, Why Plaintiffs Should Have to Prove Irreparable Harm in Copyright 
Preliminary Injunction Cases, 6 I/S: J.L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y. 67 (2010). 
To sample cases and commentary prior to the Supreme Court’s eBay case, see 
Cordis Corp. v. Medtronic, Inc., 835 F.2d 859, 864 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (effect on 
patent system) and Mark A. Lemley & Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and 
Injunctions in Intellectual Property Cases, 48 DUKE L.J. 147 (1998). 
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when and where the condition/covenant distinction really 
matters—where the proverbial rubber meets the road. In this 
sliding scale approach, the more a license condition has grounding 
in and nexus to copyright’s exclusive rights, the more likely it is 
that the court will award injunctive relief. This relieves trial courts 
of the pressure to make precise, binary “either/or” decisions about 
whether a term should be called a license condition or not, and puts 
trial judges in the accustomed role of using their experience135 in 
evaluating and weighing a variety of facts and circumstances to 
craft a nuanced remedy based on the particular ones before it.136 
Indeed, trial courts should examine other copyright related criteria 
and contract related factors as part of its assessment of whether 
granting an injunction promotes the public interest. This respects 
the Supreme Court’s reminder in the eBay case to weigh the public 
interest in the injunctive relief equation. 137  
 From a copyright policy standpoint, trial courts should give 
weight to the authorial control inherent in copyright protection,138 
but courts should also examine the extent to which the license 
contract fosters the creation and distribution of works. Many 
                                                
135 See General Instrument Corp. v. Nu-Tek Electronics & Manufacturing, Inc., 
197 F.3d 83, 90 (3d Cir. 1999). 
136 “Perhaps the most significant single component in the judicial decision 
whether to exercise equity jurisdiction and grant permanent injunctive relief is 
the court’s discretion.” WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE 37-38 (1995). “[I]n most cases the determination whether to issue 
an injunction involves a balancing of the interests of the parties who might be 
affected….” Id. at 39. “Not surprisingly, therefore, the court’s decision depends 
on the circumstances of each case.” Id. at 42. See generally MOORE’S FEDERAL 
PRACTICE 3d § 65.03 (2010). For a sample of district courts exercising their 
discretion, see, e.g., Designer Skin, L.L.C. v. S&L Vitamins, Inc., 2008 WL 
4174882 (D. Ariz. Sept. 5, 2008); Warner Bros. v. RDR Books, 575 F.Supp.2d 
513 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (Harry Potter Encyclopedia case); Ticketmaster L.L.C. v. 
RMG Technologies, Inc., 507 F. Supp.2d 1096 (C.D. Cal. 2007) (website terms 
of use); Microsoft Corp. v. McGee, 490 F. Supp.2d 874 (S.D. Ohio 2007) 
(software counterfeiting); Propet USA, Inc. v. Shugart, 2007 WL 4376204 
(W.D. Wash Dec. 13, 2007). See also Coxcom, Inc. v. Chaffee, 536 F.3d 101, 
112 (1st Cir. 2008).  
137 Decisions about injunctive relief should include consideration of the impact 
on the public interest. See eBay Inc., 547 U.S. at 391 (2006). See also Elrefaie, 
supra note 134, at 239 (“Although the public interest factor may not be 
explicitly stressed in most cases, it is a major factor in the Supreme Court’s 
reversal of the Federal Circuit’s holding in eBay.”). 
138 See Jacobsen v. Katzer, 535 F.3d 1373, 1375, 1378, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2008) 
(referring numerous times to the author’s need to control its works); McGown, 
Tory Anarchism, supra note 131, at 222 (“[E]ven if one despises the authorial 
authority embedded in property rules and presumptive injunctive relief, it is 
naïve to believe that cutting back such authority inevitably yields net gains in 
anything. It certainly does not produce inevitable net gains in “freedom” or 
“liberty,” because the freedom to take and use comes at the expense of a 
freedom to structure production and distribution as one wishes.”). 
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license contracts do protect valuable authorial rights (such as moral 
rights) and demonstrably provide the legal tool to increase creative 
collaboration and business model innovation.139 But not all 
attempts to assert authorial control via license contracts are created 
equal at all times or in all settings—some promote the overall 
purposes of copyright law better than others.140   
From a contract policy standpoint, as mentioned, license 
contracts help the parties allocate risk and provide certainty about 
the terms of their business relationship.141 The MDY Trio’s test 
threatens these goals in situations where the license contract has 
been drafted specifically to identify a term as a license condition. 
But freedom of contract is not the same at all times or in all 
settings. As suggested by the Jacobsen case, assessing “context” 
factors142 matters. For example, trial courts should weigh: Did the 
parties truly intend for the licensor to be able to take advantage of 
copyright remedies for breach of a particular provision?143 Was the 
license contract drafted clearly to reflect that fact? Was the 
contract negotiated or a standard form? How sophisticated are the 
parties?144 How robust was the licensee’s opportunity to review 
and manifest assent?145  
This multifactor, sliding scale approach has an additional 
benefit: it eliminates the need for MDY’s analytically awkward sui 
generis exception for monetary payments serving as license 
                                                
139 See Gomulkiewicz, Licensing Law Jurisprudence, supra note 61, at 204-08 
(describing how licensing can promote technological and business model 
innovation). 
140 Even though open source licensing often promotes the goals of copyright, 
whether and to what extent this is so varies from case to case. See generally 
Christian H. Nadan, Open Source Licensing: Virus or Virtue?, 10 TEX. INTELL. 
PROP. L.J. 349 (2002); Greg R. Vetter, “Infectious” Open Source Software: 
Spreading Incentives or Promoting Resistance?, 36 RUTGERS L.J. 53 (2004). 
141 See PCTV Gold, Inc. v. Speednet LLC, 508 F.3d 1137, 1145 (8th Cir. 2007) 
(weighing freedom of contract as a public interest factor to be weighed in 
assessing injunctive relief). 
142 See diagram infra for examples of factors that might help the court tease out 
the intent of the parties. 
143 See Texas Instruments Inc. v. Tessera, Inc., 231 F.3d 1325, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 
2000) (sophisticated parties form license contracts with knowledge of how 
remedies will operate in the context of their licenses, including possibility of 
injunctive relief). 
144 See Lemley, supra note 38, at 459-60 (pointing out that, surprisingly, most 
EULA cases have involved sophisticated parties rather than consumers); see 
also MDY Industries v. Blizzard Entertainment, 629 F.3d 928, 935-37 (9th Cir. 
2010) (litigants clearly sophisticated parties); Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 
356 F.3d 393 (2d Cir. 2004) (discussed by Professor Lemley as illustrative of his 
point about EULA cases). 
145 See, e.g., the Register.com and MDY cases, where the licensee viewed the 
EULA multiple times. 
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conditions.146 Under the multifactor, sliding scale approach, a 
payment-related license condition can be treated like any other 
term drafted as a license condition. There will no longer be a need 
for trial courts to treat royalty payments as special, unique, always 
actionable conditions when other consideration-related conditions 
(such as attribution, cross-licensed code, or “share alike”) fulfill 
the same objective as royalties in many licenses. 
Use of the multi-factor, sliding scale approach described 




LESS  Likelihood of Granting Injunctive Relief       MORE     
      Factors not favoring injunctive relief                           Factors favoring injunctive relief 
      No © nexus           Strong © nexus 
      No or scant (i.e., RAM copies only) © grounding  Strong © grounding  
      Does not promote © policies     Promotes © policies 
      Not drafted as condition                 Drafted as condition 
      Contract of adhesion      Negotiated contract 
      Consumer license                  Business license 
 
With this approach, licensing law can allow parties to order 
their business affairs freely, rationally, and predictably by drafting 
license contracts that best fit their circumstances, while keeping the 
power of copyright holders in check when it comes to enforcing 
the license contract. This works well for FOSS licensors, who 
often can show that their specified license conditions ultimately 
serve the goals of copyright law even though they may not fit 
neatly into the test for license conditions set out in the MDY 
case.147 Taking a fresh look at the availability of equitable relief for 
breach of copyright licenses through the lens of open source 
licensing seems to be just what Justice Kennedy had in mind in the 
eBay case when he admonished trial courts to bear in mind the 
economic impact of new ways to exploit intellectual property that 
“present conditions quite unlike earlier cases.”148 
                                                
146 Using the sliding scale approach, continued use of software without payment 
might be enjoined in certain cases (e.g., business license, payment clearly 
drafted as license condition, negotiated transaction) but not others (e.g., 
consumer license, payment not clearly drafted as license condition, contract of 
adhesion). 
147 See McGown, Tory Anarchism, supra note 131 (showing strong need for 
authorial control in open source licensing because it increases creative works). 
148 eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, 547 U.S. 388, 396 (2006) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring). Justice Kennedy was talking specifically about so-called patent 
trolls, but his general point goes beyond patents and the licensing practices of 
patent trolls. 
14 Yale J.L. & Tech. 106 (2011)        2011-2011 
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For instance, in the FOSS context, a court might grant 
injunctive relief149 for violating the “share alike” requirement of 
the GPL or the attribution requirement150 of the Artistic License if: 
(1) the licensee knew about or had a fair opportunity to review the 
requirement; (2) in the text of the license, the requirement was 
described as a license condition; (3) there is some grounding in or 
nexus to copyright beyond RAM copies, e.g., related to the 
creation of derivative works in the case of the GPL or the 
protection of moral rights in the case of the Artistic License; (4) it 
is a non-consumer transaction;151 or (5) it strongly promotes the 
greater creation and distribution of works (key goals of 
copyright).152 
I conclude this Section with a brief note of caution. Even 
though FOSS licensing can be a highly beneficial licensing 
practice that promotes the goals of copyright, whether and to what 
extent this is true varies from case to case. A decade ago, the 
discussion about FOSS153 in the software industry seemed 
polarized—FOSS was either the end of intellectual property or the 
                                                
149 This Article does not weigh in on the important question of whether 
irreparable harm should be presumed in copyright cases post-eBay. According to 
some scholars, lower courts have split on the issue. See Gomez-Arostegui, supra 
note 134, at 1209. For whether irreparable harm should be presumed from a 
normative point of view, compare Samuelson, Why Plaintiffs, supra note 134, 
with McGowan, Irreparable Harm, supra note 134. 
150 See McGowan, Irreparable Harm, supra note 134, at 590 (“Although it is 
often said that U.S. copyright law does not recognize moral rights as such, the 
law does recognize reputation as relevant to infringement remedies and treats 
reputational harm as irreparable. This is true even when the relevant aspect of 
reputation is honor rather than fame . . .”); id. at 593 (“[T]he presence of 
attribution requirements in even undemanding software licenses such as the 
BSD, MIT, and Artistic licenses is evidence that attribution plays an important 
role in the sociology of production for projects that employ such licenses (the 
same is true of licenses such as the GPL, that add an ideological component to 
attribution).”). 
151 See Texas Instruments, Inc. v. Tessera, Inc., 231 F.3d 1325, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 
2000). In the open source context, many if not most hackers are sophisticated 
about the expectations surrounding open source licenses. See generally 
Gomulkiewicz, Open Source License Proliferation, supra note 30 (describing 
hacker participation in the Open Source Initiative’s process of certifying licenses 
as complying with the Open Source Definition). 
152 See Jacobsen v. Katzer, 535 F.3d 1373, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2008); cf. Wallace v. 
IBM Corp., 467 F.3d 1104 (7th Cir. 2006) (discussing how the GPL advances 
competition law policies). 
153 See Greg R. Vetter, Exit and Voice in Free and Open Source Software 
Licensing: Moderating the Rein Over Software Users, 85 OR. L. REV. 183 
(2006); David McGowan, SCO What? Rhetoric, Law and the Future of F/OSS 
Production, 2-3, 14-15 (Univ. of Minn. Law Sch. Research Paper No. 04-9, 
2004). 
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savior of innovation.154 Today, a more pragmatic mood prevails. 
As the use of open source licensing takes on more permutations 
and as large public companies such as Apple, Amazon.com, 
Google, IBM, Intel, Microsoft, and RedHat reap great profits using 
open source as part of their business model, it has become clear 
that FOSS licensing is no more inherently good than BUS 
licensing is inherently evil.155 Indeed, many firms now use a 
combination of FOSS and BUS licensed software, leading many to 
conclude that “mixed source” is the best approach.156 In the final 
analysis, trial courts should soberly examine each use of FOSS and 
BUS licensing in its particular context, ignoring both vaporous 




Just as quickly as Jacobsen v. Katzer seemed to create 
clarity about the enforcement of open source licenses, the MDY 
Trio introduced inconvenient complications. These complications 
should not be surprising because they sit at the often-turbulent 
intersection of copyright and contract law. We should admire the 
MDY Trio’s attempt to address the tricky distinction between 
copyright first sales and licenses and the elusive distinction 
between contractual covenants and license conditions. Our 
admiration should not get in the way of refining and adjusting the 
MDY Trio’s approach, however, and that is what this Article 
proposes to do. 
                                                
154 See generally Ronald J. Mann, Commercializing Open Source Software: Do 
Property Rights Still Matter?, 20 HARV. TECH. L.J. 1 (2006). 
155 See generally Jonathan Zittrain, Normative Principles for Evaluating Free 
and Proprietary Software, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 265 (2004). 
156 See generally Greg R. Vetter, Commercial Free and Open Source Software: 
Knowledge Production, Hybrid Appropriability & Patents, 77 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 2087 (2009). 
157 See Richard Stallman & Eben Moglen, GPL Version 3: Background to 
Adoption, FREE SOFTWARE FOUNDATION (June. 10, 2005), 
http://www.fsf.org/news/gpl3.html (arguing that “free software . . . is the only 
ethically satisfactory form of software development”). 
158 See Joseph Miller, Allchin’s Folly: Exploding Some Myths About Open 
Source Software, 20 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L. J. 491 (2002) (describing anti-
FOSS rhetoric of former Microsoft executive Jim Allchin). 
